One bad result after another: 6 years after the merger, United Continental Holdingsis still unable to improve its operational performance.
If synergy between routes was a justification in the early years, the argument is no longer valid. A look back at the least successful merger of the American majors.
Majors merging under pressure from oil costs
Since 2008, the merger movement among the American majors has been underway.
- First, Delta and Northwest Airlines mergedat the beginning of 2008. This merger was quite logical since both airlines were part of the SkyTeam alliance, and their hubs were fully compatible;
- At the end of 2010, it was the turn of United and Continental Airlinesto merge: again, compatible hubs but very different airlines: Different alliance, ultra customer-oriented at Continental and much less powerful hubs at United, while Continental has an incredible strength in Houston;
- In late 2013, it was American Airlines’ turn to absorb the last independent American major, US Airways, in late 2013.
There are several reasons for these serial mergers in the United States:
- The overall profitability of American airlines following the arrival of low-cost airlines like Southwest or Frontier, or ultra-low cost airlines like Spirit ;
- The price of crude oil that was soaring in the mid-2000s.
Although this oil problem, which was thought to be recurrent, was resolved a few months ago, the profitability of U.S. airlines is still at stake, particularly the revenue per seat-kilometer, which is being aggressively challenged by market prices that have been slashed.
An example right now is a Chicago-Portland on United, with or without a connection at SFO, sold for $130 roundtrip. And eligible to earn miles and free baggage for Star Alliance Gold passengers last weekend.
Or a Chicago-Orlando on Delta for 156€ as shown in the following screenshot:
It is in this environment of ultra-tight pricing, including among the majors, that United operates today, with a cost structure that, unlike Delta or American, has not been cleaned upwith bankruptcy.
Revenue per seat per kilometer, the financial metric of reference in airlines
The operational and financial performance of an airline is measured with various key performance indicators, but the most widely observed is revenue per seat kilometer, or Revenue Per Available Seat Milein the USA, which represents the gross margin on the number of seat miles flown (obtained by multiplying the number of seats on an aircraft by the number of miles flown).
Why this metric? Because it compares the economic result to the load factor, the better the load factor (the lower the number of seat kilometers), the higher the metric.
And at United, that’s exactly what’s going wrong. The second quarter 2016 earnings announcementwas disastrous on this score, with a 7% decline over the same quarter last year. And in thefirst quarter, this metric was down over 10%!
As you know, the devil is in the details and United is careful not to tout this disastrous metric in its ads!
The new United’s initiatives to secure its profit
United is clearly behind the U.S. majors on product. While Delta was ahead of the curve with full-flat seats in the early 2000s, Delta and especially American are making significant efforts right now.
Delta’s fleet is almost completely retrofitted and American is in the process of retrofitting with world-class equipment.
So in response, United has just launched Polaris, a new Business Class product in the same vein as Delta One, hopefully to reinforce the seat-mileage revenue!



