The A380: fallen star?

Anyone with even the slightest interest in aviation had eyes only for the entry into service of the A380, the Airbus jewel, destined to steal the title of largest flying liner from the Boeing 747. The market existed: the success of the 747 had shown it. The opportunity too: the “Queen of the Skies” was aging and no successor of new conception was showing up.

the A380: a bet that could only be a winning one

It was to be a success for at least five reasons:

– there was a market for the replacement of the 747 with larger, more fuel-efficient and more comfortable aircraft.

– With the saturation of the sky and large airports in sight, a market for ultra wide-body aircraft was bound to emerge, especially since the Hub logic of the major airlines led straight to it.

– an air giant could position itself in two niches: that of ultra-high density to transport even more people for less money, and that of premium with all that its gigantic cabin allowed in terms of product creativity.

– A plane out of the ordinary could only create its own market: beyond the sphere of aviation enthusiasts, the general public was going to want to fly this plane, so big, so majestic, so silent, so out of the ordinary.

It was in November 2007 that the A380 made its commercial launch flight in Singapore Airlines livery.

10 years later, where do we stand?

The 380 : half success, half fail

Half success, half failure, the A380 program is a “succure”!

A success first of all. Because of its gigantic size, its performance, its silence, it seduces and makes dream the general public which, let’s admit it, still 10 years after, runs after the A380 experience. But the problem is that the general public buys plane tickets, not planes.

It was a success because when it was released, the promise in terms of performance was kept, the technological challenge was brilliantly met by Airbus and the airlines whose strategy was in line with the aircraft’s specifications rushed to buy it.

But a failure because finally between the launch of the program and its delivery things changed and have changed even more since then. Airbus made the bet on hubs with the 380, while at the same time Boeing made the point-to-point bet with the 787. And if the disappointments of the 787’s industrialization have made people smile, today it is the star of long-haul flights.

The A380 was made for big hubs. But especially for airlines operating mainly very long-haul routes with a large inflow of wide-body aircraft feeding a large outflow of wide-body aircraft.

Who is in this case?

Emirates, of course, and it’s not for nothing that the Dubai-based airline is the biggest customer of the A380 program. Few short-haul flights and even fewer since the link with Doha was closed (and even then this link was operated by 777), a desire to position its hub as the center of the world between Europe, Asia and the USA. No, the A380 was made for Emirates, but more than that, the airline needed such an aircraft to boost its growth.

Singapore Airlines ? To a certain extent, because although the city-state by definition only operates international flights, the proximity of its Asian neighbors gives it a substantial program of medium-haul flights. Okay, operated by 777 or 330, but a 380 is not justified on a Singapore-Bangkok route.

As a result, apart from Emirates, which has made the 380 the heart of its fleet, for the other airlines it is generally just an extra aircraft in the fleet that they try to fit in where they can fill it.

Airbus not helped by European airlines

The A380 has also suffered from two other problems.

First of all, the total disinterest of American airlines in the product. When no aircraft are sold on the other side of the Atlantic, the economic performance of a program is immediately affected.

The second is the attitude of European airlines, which have acquired A380s in small quantities, or in the case of Air France, have even converted A380 options into A350s. But was the aircraft suitable for their needs? Certainly not. These orders are more a matter of minimal European solidarity than of a real strategic plan.

Second sin of the European airlines: what they have done with the 380. Unlike Singapore Airlines and Emirates, who have turned it into a real premium flagship by innovating on the “hard product” and taking advantage of the aircraft’s potential, most Europeans have equipped it with their “standard” product found on all other long-haul aircraft. The art of losing an opportunity to make the client dream and create a real demand for the A380 product from customers.

What is the Air France flagship? The Boeing 777-300 ER, equipped with “Best & Beyond” cabins. Apart from the infrequent travelers for whom the charm still works, who wants to travel in old-fashioned cabins and, for the business traveler, not even offering a full flat seat in business class? No one. Once the magic of the first flights is over, the customer will prefer a 777 or one of the recent 787s. And with a retrofit still to come, Air France’s A380 product will not make people dream for many years to come.

What future for the A380?

10 years is a young time for an aircraft, but the program already seems to be on its last legs and Emirates will not be able to save it alone. Especially since the competitive advantage of the 380 has been eroded over time.

Where does the indisputable “Wow” effect caused by a first A380 flight come from? Silence, softness, gigantism. What is left to the 380 today? Gigantism. As far as in-flight comfort is concerned, the recent Boeing 787 and Airbus A350 have caught up. So even though the size of the device contributes to the overall impression it looks a bit thin especially since the two new arrivals on the market are economically better than the 380.

A re-engined and more powerful version? It is being talked about, Emirates is asking for it, but this does not solve the question of the adequacy between a very large aircraft and the needs/strategies of the airlines. Moreover, the failure of Boeing’s 747i program seems to confirm this: the airlines are betting on point-to-point flights with smaller aircraft that also give them more flexibility.

The saturation of the airports and the sky which is finally overdue? At Airbus they want to believe that the product was launched too early.

Un repositionnement sur le marché low cost et des vols à haute densité ? This is an avenue that Airbus is exploring, but what a setback this would be for the image of a product that was launched 10 years ago with the promise of the possibility of very premium layouts and that would find itself first on the sardine can market. And not sure the traveler will buy.

If the A380 is not dead, it will not survive without a major evolution of the product, and if we applaud the efforts and creativity of the Airbus teams to keep the flame alive in the hearts of the general public, it is too early to say what impact it will have on the airlines.

Which flagship on large aircraft?

If we seem to be heading, with a few exceptions, towards fleets made up mainly of 777s and 350s with wide-body 777s for destinations where demand is strongest (which tends to confirm the idea that we need a majority of 200/300-passenger aircraft and a few 400-passenger aircraft, and that 500-passenger aircraft and more are only a niche market), then the airlines will have to consider renewing their flagships, because this kind of decision takes time and is not taken lightly.

What will replace the 747s, 380s and 777s that will reach the end of their lives? The 777-9x seems to be the best in its category.

Unsurprisingly, Emirates is the largest customer for the 777-9x to date (115 orders out of 273), but apart from Lufthansa, which has already ordered 20 of them, no other European airline seems to be really concerned about the subject. When you know, for example, that 25 of the 777s that make up the majority of Air France’s long-haul fleet are between 15 and 20 years old, and that we have no visibility on their future replacement, this is cause for concern. And we at TravelGuys are concerned about that.