Cover photograph: SO/ Bangkok seen from Lumpini Park on February 25, 2024 (archival photograph). Photo: Welcome to Thailand / Wikimedia Commons, CC0 1.0. Photograph cropped and resized.
Parvus is calling for Sébastien Bazin to leave. In its November 19 statement, Accor’s largest shareholder says it holds 14.10% of the company’s shares. No decision on his departure has been announced, but his record over thirteen years in charge now faces a public challenge.
We believe the board should now organize an orderly handover. Accor has changed substantially under Sébastien Bazin, and its results are still improving. That work deserves recognition. It does not erase the gap in shareholder returns or settle the questions raised by a major new commitment to Ennismore, a business the group already controls. The transformation has happened; what matters now is what it has delivered for Accor and its shareholders.
Thirteen years of returns
Parvus cites total returns of 99% for Accor, 593% for IHG, 863% for Hilton and 950% for Marriott between December 11, 2013 and November 18, 2026, with dividends reinvested. The fund attributes the figures to Bloomberg; we have not independently reconstructed the calculation.
Total return measures what an investment has earned beyond the change in its share price. It includes money distributed to shareholders, so the comparison does not overlook dividends. That makes it the right measure for the fund’s criticism, which concerns the outcome of holding an investment for a long time. It does not, however, remove the differences between the companies being compared.
Those limits prevent us from attributing the entire gap to one person. Geography, hotel segments, financing conditions and the price initially paid for the shares all affect returns. We do not have a reliable breakdown that would isolate each factor’s contribution. None of those qualifications makes the gap insignificant, though. After thirteen years, investors should no longer have to wait for a reorganization to finish before assessing the work done.
The length of his tenure changes how we judge the record. In a transformation’s early years, the transactions undertaken may be the main basis for assessment; after thirteen years, there is already a track record to measure. The current team chose which businesses to develop, which to sell and which partnerships to form. Recent hotel performance is part of that record. It does not replace the returns earned by investors who held their shares throughout the period.
Shareholders had already challenged his pay
The results of the May 27, 2026 shareholders’ meeting show that 40.04% of votes cast opposed Sébastien Bazin’s 2025 compensation. For 2026, 25.77% of votes cast opposed the chairman and CEO’s compensation policy. Both resolutions passed; neither was a vote on his departure. We cannot attribute those votes to Parvus or treat them as support for its current demand.
The vote establishes something more specific: before November’s public challenge, a substantial share of votes cast had already opposed proposals concerning the CEO’s pay. Opposition was stronger to the previous year’s pay than to the rules for future compensation. That does not explain why each investor voted against, but it directly concerns the board that proposed those resolutions. When assessing the rest of his tenure, directors therefore have a signal from the shareholders’ meeting as well as the view now expressed by the largest shareholder.
From AccorInvest to Essendi: an exit that began in 2018
The change in business model remains the main achievement of Bazin’s tenure. On May 31, 2018, AccorHotels announced that it had sold 57.8% of AccorInvest for gross proceeds of €4.6 billion. The group retained a stake and long-term agreements. It was separating a large share of its owned and leased hotels from the business responsible for developing brands and services.
That changes how the company makes money. A hotel owner is directly exposed to the cost of its buildings and their operation. A group focused on franchising and management primarily seeks to grow revenue from hotels backed by other investors. Growth can then require less capital tied up in each new property. Brands, distribution and the ability to sign and retain contracts become more important to the group’s value.
Essendi is the former AccorInvest. The agreement signed on July 23, 2026 provides for the sale of Accor’s remaining stake, approximately 30.7%, for up to €975 million: €675 million at closing and up to €300 million in additional consideration. The sale has yet to close. The hotels would retain Accor brands, with a gradual move to franchising and contracts averaging twenty years.
This last step illustrates what the transformation delivers. Accor sells its stake in the operator while retaining a commercial relationship with the hotels. Guests can continue booking the same brand without seeing the ownership change. For the group, however, disposal proceeds and future revenue are different things: the former arrive once, while the latter depend on continued operations and contracts. One cannot replace the other euro for euro.
The simplification extends beyond property ownership. The notes to the 2025 financial statements say Accor lost control of Onefinestay after selling 50% of the business to Exclusive Resorts. They also record the sale of Paris Society’s Festive business. Accor continues to revise the scope of its activities. Without the financial terms of those disposals, we cannot calculate their returns or label them failures. They do show, however, that the group can already narrow its focus without waiting for new leadership.
This evolution has given Accor a business model closer to that of the major groups whose brands grow through third-party owners. Keeping long-term contracts is now central to its revenue. The owners of the hotels concerned will continue to rely on Accor’s brands and services for years after the sale. For Accor, selling its stake does not end the relationship with those hotels: it changes how the group earns money from them and how the risks are shared.
Operating performance is improving; cash generation is growing more slowly
The 2025 accounts show recurring EBITDA rising from €1.120 billion to €1.201 billion and recurring free cash flow from €614 million to €632 million. Cash conversion fell from 55% to 53%. Accor cites, among other factors, taxes paid and working capital requirements.
EBITDA measures earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; an increase does not translate in full into cash the company can use. Working capital requirements reflect, among other things, timing differences between receipts and payments. That helps explain why better operations and greater funding capacity do not progress at the same pace.
At its 2023 strategy presentation, Accor included cash conversion above 55% among its 2023–2027 targets. The 2025 result does not mean that ambition has definitively been missed. It does show the work still needed to turn a larger share of earnings into available cash. That is a particularly useful goal when assessing a company that wants to keep investing while also returning money to shareholders.
As of June 30, 2026, Accor reported net debt of €3.523 billion, compared with €3.064 billion at the end of 2025. Recurring free cash flow for the half-year reached €194 million, up 42%. The company is generating more cash, but its debt has also risen between those dates.
The date matters: this is the debt position in June, before the buyout announced in November. We cannot simply add the purchase price to that figure and call it future debt. Payments will be staggered, and disposals are expected to provide funds. The starting point remains clear, though: Accor is preparing this commitment with debt already higher than at the previous year-end. Its ability to meet the payments must be assessed alongside the cash inflows and outflows that will accompany them, rather than EBITDA growth alone.
In the third quarter of 2026, revenue per available room rose 4.9%, with the average rate up 4.7% and occupancy gaining 0.1 percentage point. Accor raised only the bottom of its annual EBITDA guidance, to €1.270 billion; the top remained €1.285 billion. Expected net network growth moved from around 3.5% to a range of 3% to 3.5%.
The recent improvement in revenue per available room therefore comes mainly from rates. For guests, that increase says nothing by itself about the service received; it primarily means rooms sold for more. On the development side, the group must also turn signed contracts into openings and account for hotels leaving the network. The pipeline exceeded 273,000 rooms at the end of September, but that volume is not net network growth. Openings take place over time, and a hotel leaving the network offsets part of the gain from a new property. Part of Accor’s future growth will depend on turning those projects into operating hotels.
Ennismore is now a substantial hotel business
Understanding Ennismore’s appeal starts with its hotels. Its official portfolio, as of June 30, 2026, lists more than 190 properties and over 160 projects across fourteen hotel and residential brands. These include The Hoxton, Mama Shelter, Mondrian and SO/. This is an established operating business with a substantial development pipeline, rather than a concept still being tested at a handful of properties.
These brands offer different places to stay, eat and spend an evening. Their appeal goes beyond room design. A restaurant or bar that attracts local customers can bring in business from people who are not staying at the hotel. For an owner, that opens other sources of revenue; for a traveler, it can make the hotel a livelier place. These are tangible reasons to choose a hotel, even when the word lifestyle is stretched to cover almost everything in hotel group presentations.
The project breakdown is worth examining: The Hoxton lists nineteen open hotels and fourteen projects; Mama Shelter has nineteen hotels and twenty-four projects. The latter’s announced pipeline therefore exceeds its existing network. That is ambitious, but a project does not yet generate the revenue of an open hotel. The hotel still has to be completed, staffed and established in its market. The distinction matters when a price paid today rests on the results that expansion is expected to produce tomorrow.
Its contribution can already be measured. Accor’s 2025 accounts attribute €205 million of EBITDA contribution to Ennismore, up from €170 million in 2024, and 18% net network growth. That progress gives the group a concrete reason to want more of the business. It also helps explain its willingness to commit a substantial sum: Accor wants a larger share of profits that are already growing while supporting further development.
When the joint venture was formed in 2021, Accor held two-thirds of the capital. It has therefore helped build the business and already benefits from its development. The partnership with founders and other investors brought the brands together on one platform while retaining their different identities. The current phase concerns the future of that partnership: the buyout and decision-making rules now matter as much to understanding the business as the list of hotels.
Buying a larger stake in a business Accor already controls
The minority buyout announced on November 17 amounts to approximately €1.6 billion. Three tranches cover 44.3% of equity on a fully diluted basis, through January 2028. Total equity is valued at approximately €3.7 billion; enterprise value represents eighteen times expected 2027 EBITDA.
The 2025 financial statement notes show that Ennismore was already fully consolidated by Accor. Its operating results already appear in the group’s figures; the buyout will not bring them in for the first time. What changes is the share of future earnings economically attributable to Accor’s shareholders rather than Ennismore’s minority investors. Assessing the ultimate benefit requires setting that increase against the financing cost. Accor is paying for an additional economic interest and greater freedom to make decisions, without suddenly adding a new business to its consolidated accounts.
The stake price, total equity value and enterprise value refer to different things. Enterprise value also takes net debt into account and allows a comparison with operating earnings. Using a forecast to calculate the multiple brings future development into today’s price. Part of the return on the purchase will therefore depend on completing those projects and building up business at the new hotels.
The history helps explain the ownership changes. In 2022, the proposed sale of a 10.8% stake for €185 million accompanied the contribution of interests in Rixos and Paris Society. The 2022 accounts confirm that it closed on November 17. More recently, Ennismore acquired the remaining 49% of Rikas for €19 million and new shares representing 3% of its own capital, according to the June 2026 accounts. That share issue dilutes the other holdings. Ownership percentages therefore change for reasons beyond an existing investor selling shares.
During the November 17 presentation, Sébastien Bazin described minority investors’ liquidity rights in years four and five, while presenting the transaction as voluntary. He described a valuation by five banks using the same forecasts: the highest and lowest valuations are discarded and the remaining three averaged. We have not read the contract governing those rights. These are management’s explanations, and the valuation process alone does not prove that the price is favorable to Accor.
Those rights help explain the timing and place the buyout in the context of the original partnership. The board must take those rights into account when assessing the buyout, then decide how to finance it. Our reservations concern those choices: the use of cash, borrowing and possible payment in shares. For investors who remain Accor shareholders, the additional return expected from Ennismore must be sufficient after those costs.
Bazin says the buyout will speed up decisions that required unanimity. We understand the appeal of faster decisions for a growing network. The benefit still needs to be weighed against the cost of the buyout. A larger share of profits can be assessed against forecasts; judging what the removal of unanimity requirements will deliver requires identifying the projects that would become easier to pursue.
An IPO or a new partnership would change the ownership structure again. Its appeal would depend on the partner chosen, the funding provided and the transaction price. We prefer to judge the buyout by the earnings Accor can retain as a shareholder before relying on a subsequent transaction. That allows the investment to be assessed even if markets close or the group chooses to wait. The development of the hotels remains the economic basis of the investment, whatever form its ownership takes next.
What the financing means for continuing shareholders
The announced financing includes at least €500 million in disposals and a portion payable in cash or shares at Accor’s discretion. During the presentation, CFO Martine Gerow referred to approximately €500 million in additional debt. These funding sources will have consequences at different times.
The timing of disposal receipts matters alongside the announced amount. Accor must complete the sales and collect the proceeds before that cash becomes available. If receipts arrive after payments to the minority investors fall due, the group may have to borrow more during the transition.
Accor’s finance page lists an S&P rating of BBB− with a stable outlook, dated November 14, 2025, and Fitch BBB, stable, dated June 19, 2026. Both ratings are investment grade. They matter to the financing: the cost and availability of credit also depend on confidence in the group’s financial strength. Management has committed to retaining investment-grade status. That requires future payments, disposals and other commitments to be assessed together. We do not have a verified forward-looking leverage ratio that would let us measure the remaining borrowing capacity here.
The scale of the buyout matters: the consideration is more than twice Accor’s recurring free cash flow in 2025. Payments are staggered, and disposals are expected to help fund them. The comparison therefore does not mean the group must finance the entire purchase from a single year’s operations. It shows the size of the commitment relative to a resource that must also fund the group’s other choices. Improving cash conversion becomes a very practical concern in that context.
The Essendi-linked program provides for a €500 million share buyback funded from the disposal proceeds. At the same time, payment for part of Ennismore in stock remains possible. For an investor who keeps their shares, the final effect will depend on what has been repurchased, what has been handed over to the sellers and the respective prices. We would rather see those changes in share capital presented together with the financing than assess each announcement separately.
Our reservations therefore concern the choices still open: the cash contribution, borrowing, possible use of shares and role of future transactions. The liquidity rights explain why the minority investors’ exit must be addressed; they do not remove the need to examine those choices. The board can prepare the leadership transition while honoring commitments already made. Above all, it needs to show how much financial flexibility the next team will inherit and which decisions it will still be free to make.
At The Hoxton, the Accor name does not guarantee ALL benefits
The group organized itself into two divisions in 2023: Premium, Midscale & Economy, and Luxury & Lifestyle. The first is structured geographically; the second around brands, with shared platforms, notably for technology and digital services. The arrangement recognizes that developing every brand does not call for the same approach.
We argued for the value of clearly defined budget hotel brands when Marriott acquired City Express, using ibis as one point of comparison. Accor’s range of hotel categories is an asset: a customer may need a budget hotel for one trip and choose a more expensive hotel for another. Its established brands and lifestyle hotels serve different occasions. Bringing them together is also valuable if it helps retain a customer whose budget or type of trip changes.
For loyal guests, however, the meaningful boundary is the benefits available when they book. ALL’s official list of exceptions still excludes most The Hoxton properties, with a few named exceptions. At a nonparticipating hotel, members cannot earn Reward or Status points, redeem points or receive status benefits.
Consider an Accor regular choosing between a nonparticipating Hoxton and another group hotel in the program. The first may better suit the stay they want; the second lets them earn and use their loyalty benefits. Both belong to Accor’s portfolio, but they have different relationships with its program. Having a large number of brands does not automatically give guests consistent recognition across all the hotels.
The choice resembles the one we examined in the Hyatt–Delta partnership: a partner’s name draws attention, then the precise terms determine what travelers can actually get. We would like to see ALL benefits available across more brands, wherever agreements with the hotels allow. And when a property remains outside the program, that exception should be clearly shown at booking. The minority buyout announces no change to ALL’s rules. Guests should be able to choose today on the basis of the benefits actually available, rather than those they might assume come with a hotel belonging to the group.
An orderly handover with separate chairman and CEO roles
The 2025 Universal Registration Document already describes a succession process led by the senior independent director and vice-chair of the board, together with the chair of the Appointments and Compensation Committee, supported by an external firm and regular reports to the board. Preparation therefore did not begin with Parvus’s letter. That account names neither a successor nor a firm timetable.
In a November 17 interview with Les Échos, reported by AFP, Sébastien Bazin again discussed that work. He had also told shareholders that he could leave before May 2028 if the board found the right person. Those statements preceded the public demand for his departure. They are neither a response to it nor an announcement that a transition has already been decided.
The groundwork exists; it now needs to lead to a decision. The board can draw on the work already done on candidates. It also has a long record to assess and objections voiced by shareholders. We favor an orderly handover that gives the new team clear responsibility. Completing the Essendi sale and developing Ennismore will give it specific tasks to carry out. Its mandate can be built around those businesses, the cash they generate and the commercial relationships with hotels and customers.
Parvus wants a freeze on major commitments, notably share issues related to Ennismore. We support a review of financing and ownership choices that remain discretionary. It must take account of the partners’ rights as management has described them, and contracts already signed. A leadership transition does not allow those commitments to be set aside. It does make it particularly useful to distinguish between what is owed, what has been negotiated and what remains to be decided before the final payment dates.
The board bears its share of responsibility for the record. Its rules of procedure require prior approval for acquisitions above €100 million, measured by enterprise value for interests in companies, as well as major strategic transactions. The directors who authorize the Ennismore transaction also have to answer for it. They must assess the merits of the financing and its effect on share capital. A change of CEO would leave their responsibility for commitments approved during the transition intact.
We also favor separating the roles of chairman and CEO, an option permitted by Accor’s articles of association. In the present circumstances, a separate chair would be better placed to oversee the assessment of the next CEO and commitments made during the transition. Separating the jobs does not guarantee good appointments. It would, however, draw a clearer line between the person proposing strategy and the person organizing its oversight.
These matters will still need to be monitored after the next CEO is appointed. The stages of the Ennismore transaction, completion of the Essendi sale and conversion of earnings into cash provide specific measures to track. The board could then assess how the next CEO carries out the work assigned, keeping the announcement of a transaction distinct from its effects. That distinction is particularly useful in a group where much of the development rests on contracts signed years before hotels open.
The July reports are a separate matter. On July 17, Zonebourse, citing the Financial Times, reported that Bazin had a romantic relationship with a former external communications adviser appointed at Ennismore in 2025. The reported relationship was outside the board-commissioned inquiry into possible conflicts of interest and favoritism. In its July 19 response to Hotel vor9, Accor said BDGS had found no breach of legal or fiduciary duties and no evidence of conflicts of interest or favoritism. The board had approved the findings and closed the matter.
Those facts do not establish that misconduct occurred. We have no evidence that Parvus bases its demand on this episode. Our view on succession rests on the returns during Bazin’s tenure and current financial decisions; the reported personal information does not add a reason to remove him.
The financial record remains the basis of our position. The gap in returns, the time elapsed and the commitments ahead now justify an orderly handover. Operating performance is still improving: Accor can prepare for change without waiting for a crisis. Sébastien Bazin will leave a profoundly transformed group. It is for the board to choose the leadership for the next phase and, alongside that team, take responsibility for the transactions it authorizes.
